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Ideologies of moral exclusion: A critical discursive reframing of 
depersonalization, delegitimization and dehumanization 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on some of the issues that arise when one treats notions 
such as depersonalization, delegitimization and dehumanization as social practices. It 
emphasizes the importance of: (a) understanding depersonalizing, delegitimizing and 
dehumanizing constructions as embedded in descriptions of located spatial activities 
and moral standings in the world and (b) invoking and building a socio-moral order 
linked to notions of lesser humanity or non-humanity, (spatial) transgression and 
abjection. These concerns are illustrated by taking talk on Romanies as a case in point 
taken from interviews with Romanian middle-class professionals. It is argued that a 
focus on description rather than explanation might be more effective in understanding 
the dynamics of ideologies of moral exclusion. 
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The repeated ethno-nationalistic tensions in Eastern Europe together with the ethnic 
conflicts in the Middle East and recent (and not so recent) controversies concerning 
race, racism, multiculturalism and issues related to immigration in Western Europe 
and elsewhere have captured the imagination of social scientists. Since their 
inception, the social sciences (and social psychology in particular) have felt that they 
have something very important to say about dealing with racism, discrimination, 
social inequality, intergroup conflict, bias, oppression and moral exclusion as 
important ‘social issues’, ‘social problems’. 
The most relevant theoretical and research developments on such ‘social 
issues’ have been mainly directed to the relatively mild forms of intergroup bias 
(Hewstone et al., 2002) and have not dealt substantively with the issue of extreme 
manifestations of prejudice. The context provided for understanding intergroup 
discrimination and related notions has been based mainly on the assumption of 
positive in-group love rather than negative, extreme out-group hostility (Brewer, 
1999, 2001).  
There have been nevertheless several warnings (but few attempts) at going 
beyond this framework of intergroup bias (e.g., Hewstone & Cairns, 2001; Hewstone 
et al., 2002; Reynolds & Turner, 2001; Turner & Reynolds, 2001). For example, one 
of the ways to go beyond a traditional intergroup bias framework has been to argue 
for an integration of the main intergroup approaches and competitive tests between 
theories of social psychological motivations (cf. Hewstone et al., 2002; see also 
Brewer & Gaertner, 2001). Another way of going beyond this traditional framework 
of intergroup bias has been grounded in the belief that “understanding ‘prejudice’ 
requires recognition that it is a group process that originates in the psychology of the 
group, intergroup relations, and the reality of human social conflict” (Reynolds & 
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Turner, 2001, p.178). For Reynolds and Turner (2001), social antagonism, as a 
psychologically rational and valid product of the way members of certain groups 
perceive the social structure of intergroup relations, ‘arises from and reflects their 
subjectively-apprehended understanding of the relationships between groups in 
society’ (p. 160, emphasis in original; see also Turner and Reynolds, 2001; Turner, 
1999a, b). 
None of these attempts have been able to offer a fully satisfactory account of 
the link ‘between intergroup bias and more corrosive forms of social hostility’ 
(Hewstone et al., 2002, p. 575). There are several reasons for this. On one hand, one 
has still to deal with theories that posit the inevitability of unequal social relations 
(such as social dominance theory, system justification theory) (Reicher, 2004). One 
the other hand, one has to deal with theories that define ideological orientation in 
terms of psychological processes rather than content (Durrheim, 1997).  
Another very important element is the problems socio-cognitive approaches 
face in distinguishing between prejudice and extreme prejudice, to account for ‘the 
continuum between prejudice and bigotry or between depersonalization and 
dehumanization’ (cf. Billig, 2002, p. 183). Starting with Tajfel’s use of the notion of 
‘depersonalization’ (see Billig, 2002 for an extensive account), one can chart the 
inability of social-cognitive approaches to deal with extreme prejudice. Tajfel 
believed that ‘depersonalization’ was similar to categorization in being a common 
aspect of intergroup phenomena (Billig, 2002). He thought of depersonalization as a 
‘common denominator’ (Tajfel, 1981, p. 241) in the minimal group context and actual 
warfare. He used the term ‘depersonalization’ to refer to a ‘milder’ form of 
dehumanization of outgroups (Tajfel, 1981) without elaborating on the possible 
continuum between depersonalization and dehumanization. Later work on social 
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identity has instituted a crucial change in the use of the term ‘depersonalization’. For 
example, within self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 1999a), there 
is a move away from Tajfel’s notion of depersonalization of out-group members 
toward linking depersonalization to the self and the in-group (cf. Billig, 2002). There 
is also a move from the negative (social problem) to positive (a gain in identity). 
‘Depersonalization’ is no longer invariably assumed to be a social problem. It is 
stripped off of its negative connotations and its implications for ‘dehumanization’ are 
obscured (see Hogg, 1996, for an example). 
The main argument of this paper is that one needs a re-contextualization of 
depersonalization, delegitimization and dehumanization as social practices within a 
critical framework that goes beyond psychological dynamics within unequal power 
relations and demarcates ‘the “ordinary” from the “abnormal”, or the mild from the 
strong’ (Billig, 2002, p. 181). It does so by acknowledging that ‘depersonalization 
should not be restricted to the depersonalization of the self, nor should it be seen as a 
cognitive process that somehow lies behind language’ (Billig, 2002, p. 184) and that 
dehumanization constitutes an extreme form of depersonalization. It also takes into 
account the existence of different types of prejudice and the idea that not all 
prejudices (and for that matter, all target groups) are the same (Billig, 2002; Tileagă, 
2005a, b) As such, it is necessary to avoid reductionist theories that seek to explain 
social and ideological processes by reference to psychological processes, without 
examining their contextual specificity and their relations to differentiated targets of 
prejudice.  
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Ontologization and infra-humanization 
There have been nevertheless attempts to acknowledge that not all prejudices 
and not all target groups are the same. For example, within social representations 
theory, the concept of ‘ontologization’ has been proposed and used to account for a 
process of ethnic group classification, which, in a way, was deviating from the general 
pattern of latent and blatant prejudice and discrimination (Chulvi & Perez, 2003; 
Moscovici & Perez, 1997, 2005; Perez et al., 2001, 2002). In a nutshell, this concept 
points to the idea that some minorities are more discriminated against than others. In 
particular, ‘ontologization’ refers to the representation of certain minorities outside 
the social realm, outside the realm of ‘humanity’ (the case of the Romanies/Gypsies is 
taken as a case in point). 
The concept of ‘ontologization’ put forward by social representations theorists 
relies on a nature/culture dimension and a distinction between ‘ontologization’ and 
‘discrimination’ (Moscovici & Perez, 2005), which is used as a basis for social 
classification. According to the logic of ‘ontologization’, prejudice against out-groups 
is not only evaluative (the realm of ‘discrimination’), but also semantic-
anthropological (the realm of ‘ontologization’) (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005).  
In this case, one is dealing with a form of discrimination that differs from 
traditional psychological notions of prejudice, one within which ‘others’ are judged in 
terms of animal (natural), but not human (cultural) characteristics1.  
One can note that this kind of theorizing of dehumanization is couched in 
terms of a majority/minority dichotomy, social influence, social cognition and 
representational processes. It does not include a moral dimension, but ‘ontologization’ 
is simply viewed as a psychological mechanism to achieve social exclusion. For 
                                                 
1 Paradoxically, it is also implied that it is the refusal of ethnic minorities to integrate in society that 
leads to their ‘ontologization’ and to a failure of the majority to convert a minority (Perez et al., 2001). 
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example, it has been experimentally demonstrated that ‘ontologization’ may imply a 
social exclusion without, nevertheless, falling into negative discrimination (Perez et 
al, 2002). Once the distinction between ‘discrimination’ and ‘ontologization’ is 
operated, the two realms are kept apart, and ‘ontologization’ is said to be functioning 
independently of negative evaluative judgements. This can be seen as a similar move 
to that of social identity theorists, who, abstracting ‘depersonalization’ of any 
negative connotation and moving the attention from the out-group to the in-group, are 
not linking it any more with ‘dehumanization’. 
Infra-humanization theory is another relatively recent attempt by social 
psychologists to offer some more empirical evidence of dehumanization processes 
(Leyens et al., 2000, 2001, 2003; Paladino et al., 2002). Infra-humanization theory 
starts from an universal notion of ‘being human’ and possessing human attributes 
(characteristics) linked to a theory of primary and secondary emotions. As opposed to 
‘ontologization’ theory, it does not start from the assumption that some groups are 
more discriminated than others, but it does share the interest in the anthropological 
view of human nature and human ‘essence’.  Located within  a strong in-group/out-
group context and positing the primacy of the in-group (Leyens et al., 2003) it claims 
that ‘restricting the full human nature to ingroups leads to “infrahumanize” outgroups’ 
(Paladino et al., 2002, p. 115).   
Infra-humanization theory owes most of its analytic and empirical scaffolding 
to social identity theory, self-categorization theory and social cognition.  According to 
new developments in social identity theory, we need privileged or significant others 
which form the in-group (Yzerbyt et al., 2000). ‘Infra-humanisation’ is described as 
being ‘a phenomenon which integrates both ingroup favouritism and outgroup 
derogation’ (Leyens et al., 2003, p. 705) and is said to be close to the notion of moral 
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exclusion (Bar-tal, 1989; Opotow, 1990a) or lesser-perceived humanity (Schwarz & 
Struch, 1989). 
Infra-humanization is not presented as being restricted to the in-group (or the 
dominant group(s)), but it is claimed that ‘both dominant and dominated groups can 
infra-humanize each other’ (Leyens et al., 2003, p. 706). As such, infra-humanization 
is a general, universal pheomenon as ‘outgroup derogation is not the exclusivity of 
dominant groups’ (Leyens et al., 2003, p. 706).  Arguably, this claim regarding 
balance and the universality of the theory does not account for the unequal weight of 
derogation and differentiated targets of prejudice (as ‘ontologization’ theory, for 
example does) and the unequal relations that have caused it in the first place. It does 
not consider the possibility that the ideological effects of this ‘reciprocal’ infra-
humanization might be different depending on the social and ideological context of 
inter-group relations. All this is cashed out in an universal process, as according to the 
authors, ‘at some point, all groups believe that they are superior to other ones’ 
(Leyens et al., 2003, p. 706). Leyens et al. (2000) have provided sustained evidence 
that there is a tendency for in-group members to attribute more prototypically 
‘human’ emotional attributes to their fellow group members than they do to out-group 
members. The implication of this type of research is that, such beliefs could, in the 
last instance, legitimize the ‘inhuman’ treatment of certain out-groups.  
One can note how, notwithstanding their differences, for approaches like 
ontologization and infra-humanization theory, dehumanization entails the removal of 
a group from the domain of moral acceptability (Bar-Tal, 1990; Opotow, 1990, 1995) 
and point to notions such as moral exclusion and the moral order. Nevertheless, both 
of these theories seem to ‘offer the prospect of a general, and hence generalizable, 
theory of out-group hate’ (Brown, 2002, p. 197).  What seems to be more important is 
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the generality of the phenomenon across contexts (be it ‘infra-humanization’ or 
‘ontologization’) and its ability to explain the social representational and identity 
context of social inclusion/exclusion. 
In the perspective adopted here, how people are positioned and constructed is 
not a matter of applying universal inference-rich references to ‘valid’ stereotypes, 
natural/cultural characteristics, essentially human emotions or universal processes. 
Rather, it is a matter of a contextual and discursive application of a moral (as opposed 
to an intra-psychic) order. That such a moral order might be significant for social 
psychology is made clear by the implications brought forward by a critical discursive 
psychology (Billig, 2002; Wetherell, 2003) which attempts to bridge detailed 
interactional analyses with social, critical concerns (Tileagă, 2005a, b; 2006a, b). 
Moral exclusion and delegitimization 
According to Opotow, ‘moral exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are 
perceived as outside the boundary in which moral values, rules and considerations of 
fairness apply’ (Opotow, 1990a, p. 1, italics in original). The term ‘delegitimization’ 
has been introduced as a very important social psychological process that permits 
moral exclusion. For Bar-Tal, delegitimization constitutes the extreme case of 
stereotyping and prejudice (Bar-Tal, 1989). He describes delegitimization as a 
specific case of group categorization -  categorization of a group or groups into 
extremely negative social categories that are excluded from the realm of acceptable 
norms and/or values’ (1990, p. 65, italics in original).  Bar-Tal argues that 
‘delegitimization, the exclusion of an outgroup and denial of its humanity, is a 
phenomenon with cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects’ (1990, p. 78)2.   
                                                 
2 Having as background notions such as ‘moral values’, ‘moral community’, ‘justice/injustice’, ‘moral 
boundaries’, ‘social inclusion/exclusion’ - to name just a few - research on moral exclusion has 
traditionally focused on issues such as moral exclusion in individuals (Deutsch, 1990; Staub, 1990), 
moral exclusion in society (e.g. deWind, 1990) and ways of deterring moral exclusion (Opotow, 
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 As Graumann suggests, ‘what the authors of moral exclusions do not explicitly 
state and study is the fact that it is primarily and sometimes exclusively by moral 
discourse that we separate from and exclude others’ (1998, p. 47).  Although pointing 
to the process of moral boundary drawing, authors Bar-tal, Staub or Deutsch tend to 
point more to the psychological ‘distance’ between groups, the psychological 
mechanisms involved in this process, than to the moral ‘distance’ and the implications 
of the flexible use of a moral discourse. Although a moral dimension is present, there 
is no programmatic concern with charting the discursive accomplishment and 
management of moral exclusion in actual instances of occurrence. 
What is needed is an attempt of re-conceptualization of depersonalization, 
delegitimization and dehumanization in discursive terms, a look at how particular 
ways of speaking might depersonalize (and sometimes, dehumanize) the ‘other’ (cf. 
Billig, 2002, p. 184) and how they are actually accomplished in interaction and in talk 
about ‘others’. What is needed is an approach that cuts across the traditional 
individual/social dualism, as well as the traditional micro/macro and 
majority/minority divisions (Potter, 2003). An approach with a focus on the way 
moral standings in the world, the social structure of group and category relations are 
being ‘produced’, that is described, invoked, categorized, for action and interaction. 
This paper illustrates how a critical discursive approach which attempts to 
bridge detailed interactional analyses with social, critical concerns can inform social 
psychologists’ understanding of the ways in which  delegitimization and 
dehumanization (as an extreme form of depersonalization) are brought off in talk,  
how they are produced and reproduced, both as ‘social’ and as rhetorically potent 
                                                                                                                                            
1990b).. Interesting developments were also made by human geographers (see inter alia Sibley, 1998; 
Wilton, 1998) who promoted an innovative and original thinking about the role that specific spatialities 
play in constructing and reproducing individuals and groups as different and their consequences for 
social and moral exclusion. 
 
 10 
devices for the discursive management of category memberships, extreme ‘difference’ 
and moral standings in the world.  
In a nutshell, the attempt is to ‘respecify’ social psychological concepts such 
as depersonalization, delegitimization and dehumanization in terms of how they are 
managed, framed, enacted in diverse ways in talk. This involves re-working, re-
framing such notions as discourse practices (Potter, 2003). Rather than conceiving, for 
example, concerns with delegitimization and dehumanization as reflections of what 
people carry inside their heads, a matter of attributing natural/cultural characteristics 
or primary/secondary emotions to those classed as out-groups,  people are shown to 
flexibly work up, formulate the nature of actions, events, their and other people’s 
accountability through ways of talking that depersonalize, delegitimize and 
dehumanize a particular group (the Romanies) within the cultural and discursive 
practices of (Romanian) society.   
 
Critical discursive psychology 
The theoretical and methodological background of this paper is that of a 
critical discursive psychology that attempts to bridge an ethnomethodological and 
conversationally analytical inspired discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 2001, 
2005) with critical3, social concerns within social psychology (Billig, 2002; 
Wetherell, 1998, 2003). 
This is an extension of previous critical social psychological work (Tileagă, 
2005a, b; 2006a) on the language of prejudice and extreme prejudice that rests on a 
view of social inequality and unequal social relations as both social and interactional 
                                                 
3 Critical, in the sense that it tries to uncover the role of discursive practices in the creation and 
reproduction of ideological meanings that are shaping social and category relations, unequal power 
relations.  
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objects (Tileagă, 2006b). This is linked to the belief that discursive acts are 
constitutive of and constituted by social and political ‘realities’ and it is through 
language practices that relations of power, dominance and exploitation become 
reproduced and legitimated (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). 
Taking talk about Romanies as a case in point, this paper is focusing on the 
situational and flexible deployment of depersonalizing/delegitimatizing/dehumanizing 
category formulations and relations, and at the same time aligning it with critical, 
social concerns (Wetherell, 2003). This paper also makes the case for a study of 
ideologies of depersonalization, delegitimization and dehumanization with a concern 
for the locatedness of construction of extreme difference. As argued elsewhere 
(Tileaga, 2005a), ideologies of ‘moral exclusion’ imply a notion of place, which is the 
yardstick against which ideological and exclusionary discourse is put together and 
prejudice and bigotry enacted.  
Both traditional social psychological approaches, such as ‘ontologization’ and 
‘infra-humanization’ theory (as well as discursive approaches to the language of 
prejudice) have neglected the locatedness and place-boundedness of (extreme) 
prejudice, the political dimension of one’s representation of place (Dixon, Reicher & 
Foster, 1997; Dixon & Reicher, 1997)4.  
Constructing particular ethnic groups as out-of-place, as transgressing 
normative place-appropriate conduct, as abject, as repulsive (or as inviting repulsion), 
act as symbolic resources for reproducing their delegitimization, their 
depersonalization (and ultimately their dehumanization). This makes relevant the idea 
of considering depersonalizing, delegitimizing and dehumanizing concerns as 
                                                 
4 As some authors have noted, the relationship between space, social activity and a socio-moral order is 
relevant across different contexts, but seldom explicitly acknowledged within social psychological 
theory (Dixon, 2001; Stokoe & Wallwork, 2003)  
 
 12 
extending beyond the boundaries of the activities involved in interview-talk 
(Wetherell, 1998, 2003), placing them within discursive history, the social, political 
and ideological context. Recasting processes such as depersonalization, 
delegitimization and dehumanization as discursively bound opens the way for the 
investigation of the social and political consequences of extreme discursive 
patterning, understanding and interpreting the dynamics of extreme prejudiced 
discourse. 
 
Social and political context 
The Romanian political ‘transition’ has been an interesting mix of democratic 
and liberal rhetoric (Gallagher, 1995), echoes of Ceausescu’s nationalist communism 
and reverberations of 1930s fascist right-wing ideology (Volovici, 1991) One of the 
main defining elements of the Romanian political ‘transition’ has been represented by 
the political appeals and counter-appeals of Romanian and Hungarian nationalism, 
which have increasingly saturated Romania’s political field (until 2001 at least) 
(Gallagher, 1998; Tismăneanu, 1998). One other very important element has been the 
widespread anti-Roma/Gypsy sentiment, which has had a very strong discriminatory 
character and has been accompanied by outbursts of extreme violence (see ERRC, 
1996 and 2001).  
The increasing power of the right-wing, ultra-nationalist parties in the 1990s, 
has encouraged a ‘politics of intolerance’ (Gallagher, 1995) towards ethnic minorities 
(mainly the Hungarian and the Romany minority) through the intermediary of a 
nationalistic, racist and xenophobic discourse, incitement to hatred and extreme 
violence. Whereas the discourse of the right-wing on the Hungarian minority has been 
mainly characterised by outbursts of extreme nationalism and ethnocentrism, their 
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discourse on the Romanies had clear fascist underpinnings (with clear eliminationist 
connotations).  
It is worth noting that prejudiced and discriminatory discourse against the 
Romanies has not only come from political extremists, but also from across the whole 
Romanian civic and political spectrum (Hockenos, 1993). As Mungiu-Pippidi (1999) 
argues in her excellent study about Transylvania, the presence of the Romanies does 
not somehow matter for Romanians and Hungarians alike, who are often united in 
their resentment and contempt for them. Both Romanians and Hungarians share pretty 
much the same basic negative stereotypes of the Roma population: dirty, lazy, thieves 
(Ethnobarometer, 2000). 
 
Analytic context 
 
The extracts presented here are taken from a corpus of thirty-eight recorded 
semi-structured interviews (collected in the year 2001) with middle-class Romanian 
professionals, both male and female, selected to cover a variety of social backgrounds 
in the region of Transylvania (north-western part of Romania). None of interviewees 
were part of an ethnic minority group, they were all majority group members 
(ethnically Romanian). The research has been introduced as looking at ‘people’s 
views on society and its actors’. All participants were guaranteed confidentiality and 
anonymity. The recruitment has been based on a ‘snowball’ sampling technique. Each 
individual interview lasted between one hour-one hour and a half. Interviews were 
tape-recorded and later transcribed using a version of the well-known set of 
conventions that have been developed by Gail Jefferson for conversation analysis.  
The extracts used were translated from the original Romanian into English by the 
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author of this paper. The analysis has been conducted on the original, but the 
references in the text are made to the English version.  
The interviews discussed generally ‘controversial’ issues regarding prejudice 
and prejudice related issues in Romanian society, the (contested) existence of 
prejudice and discrimination against the Hungarians, and respectively the Romanies, 
inter-ethnic conflict, minority rights and other general issues related to politics, 
prejudice and culture. 
Each interview, while 'conversational' (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and ‘active’ 
(Holstein & Gubrium, 1997) in nature, has been structured around a pre-designed and 
piloted schedule of questions and comments, albeit often introduced in different ways 
and sometimes in a different order, which allowed the exploration of a relatively 
standard range of topics with each participant. Interview responses were not treated as 
simply true or false accounts of reality, but instead ‘as displays of perspectives and 
moral forms’ (Silverman, 2001, p. 112, emphasis in original). The interviewer’s and 
interviewee’s subjectivity has been seen as locally produced sequentially in and 
through talk (Rapley, 2001; Edwards, 2003).  
 
Analysis 
 
As the specific interest here is in depersonalization, delegitimization and 
dehumanization practices, examples were selected from the corpus which directly or 
indirectly invoked depersonalizing, delegitimizing and dehumanizing categorizations 
and moral standings in the world. The extracts presented here offer a set of instances 
of displays of and orientations to a social and spatial moral order, constructions of 
extreme difference and transgressive (human) presence whose effect is to delegitimize 
and dehumanize the Romanies.  
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The analysis starts with Sandra, a fifty-one year old speech therapist. The 
excerpt presented here is part of a quite long answer to an invitation to talk about the 
situation and behaviour of Romanies.  
 
Extract 1 
 
 
427 
428 
429 
430 
431 
432 
433 
434 
435 
436 
 
 
 
Sandra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[…] 
They have received accommodation in a block of flats (.) well, after 
they received it (.) they had the block brand new (.) at (.) after a 
maximum of two months, the block was looking as if it had been 
bombed (.) without windows, without doors (mm) dirty on the stairs 
(.) I have (.) I have no words (.) and then (.) after a while the 
mass-media was saying that they don’t have accommodation (.) okay, 
they don’t have (.) they couldn’t give to all of them (.) but what 
has been given, it hasn’t been kept in good condition (.) and then,  
it is always the Romanian who is to blame (.) not (.) him  
(.) the gypsy? (.)   
 
   
 
 
 
427 
428 
429 
430 
431 
432 
433 
434 
435 
436 
 
 
 
Sandra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[…] 
Au primit locuinţe în bloc (.) păi, după ce  
le-a dat (.) le-a dat blocul la cheie (.) la (.) După  
maxim două luni, blocul arăta ca după  
bombardament (.) fără geamuri, fără uşi (mm) cu mizerie pe scări  
(.) N-am (.) n-am ce să spun (.) şi atunci (.) după câtva timp  
mass-media a umplut-o că n-au locuinţe (.) păi  
n-au (.) n-au putut sa dea la toţi (.) dar şi  
ce s-a dat , nu s-a păstrat (.) Şi atunci,  
tot românul este de vină (.) nu (.) el  
(.) ţiganul? (.) 
 
   
 
In lines 427-430 it is said that: ‘they have received accommodation in a block 
of flats (.) well, after they received it (.) they had the block brand new (.) at (.) after a 
maximum of two months, the block was looking as if it had been bombed (.) without 
windows, without doors (mm) dirty on the stairs (.)’. The description that Sandra 
gives is a very interesting one and can be understood as doing ‘moral work’ (Drew, 
1998). As discursive psychologists have shown, our descriptions are accountable 
phenomena through which we recognizably display an action’s (im)propriety, 
(un)suitability or  (in)appropriateness and they provide ‘a basis for evaluating the 
‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of whatever is being reported’ (Drew, 1998, p. 295).  
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Sandra’s moral evaluative position is not quite explicit:’ I have (.) I have no 
words (.)’ (line 431). There is a sense of moral indignation in this formulation and this 
implicitly points to the gravity of the matter under discussion. The story, on the other 
hand, is an explicit formulation of transgression. Sandra tells us that ‘they have 
received accommodation in a block of flats, that ‘they had the block brand new’ and 
that in a short amount a time, ‘ a maximum of two months’ the block ‘was looking as 
if it had been bombed (.) without windows, without doors (mm) dirty on the stairs (.)’. 
It is not said what exactly has been done in order to obtain such a result, but the 
description of the state of the block does not need any explanation.  The ‘out-of-
placeness’ (Dixon, Reicher & Foster, 1997; Stokoe & Wallwork, 2003) of Romanies 
and an ideology of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour (Stokoe & Wallwork, 2003) is 
being invoked to warrant the protest and indignation.  
Note the formulation ‘they have received accommodation … ’ (from ‘us’) 
(line 427) and ‘what has been given’ (line 433-434) which implicitly points to ‘our’ 
magnanimity and good will. It is through a contrast between ‘best intentions’ of 
‘offering’ Romanies a place to stay and the resulting outcome of their behaviour that 
the latter is portrayed as being offensive and reprehensible. As Drew (1998) suggests, 
‘accounts produced in the context of talk in which moral work is quite overt and 
explicit appear to be generally condemnatory; that is they are associated with 
complaints about the behaviours of others (in ‘reconstructed’ versions of their 
behaviour)’ (p. 296).  
There is also an implicit orientation to the issue of intentional and deliberate 
conduct in order to make manifest the transgression by the Romanies of normative 
standards of conduct and hence to warrant her final sense of moral indignation. The 
outcome of the behaviour of Romanies is described (the block of flats looking as ‘if it 
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had been bombed (.) without windows, without doors (mm) dirty on the stairs (.)’ in 
such a way that ‘the fault is not to be regarded as accidental, inadvertent, or otherwise 
innocent’ (Drew, 1998, p. 316). By describing the negative and extreme outcomes of 
the behaviour of Romanies, Sandra has not only exhibited their ‘conduct’ as being 
reprehensible (Drew, 1998), but also ‘themselves’ as being reprehensible.  
There is also a sense of this being a legitimate complaint as it is implicitly 
considered that anyone would find the actions (and the people) described as (being) 
reprehensible, and as such they appear to transgress the psychological interests of the 
complainants (Stokoe & Wallwork, 2003).  
Sandra’s seemingly rhetorical question in lines 434-436: ‘and then, it is always 
the Romanian who is to blame (.) not (.) him (.) the gypsy? (.)’ does not only hint to a 
‘us’ vs. ‘them’ contrast. This is the voice of the ‘dispossessed’ (Billig, 1978, p. 296), 
an anguished and rather angered voice that points to the fact that the moral order has 
been turned upside down and as a consequence ‘we’ are the ones that get the blame. 
The use of ‘always’ points to the unreasonableness of this blaming of ‘us’ and at the 
same time, in the light of the evidence that she has put forward, the reasonableness of 
blaming the Romanies for their own predicament.   
The behaviour of Romanies is being problematized by pointing to an 
‘extreme’ case (cf. Verkuyten, 2001) and at the same time, Romanies get ‘morally 
constituted’ (Jayyusi, 1993) as being ‘out of place’. The reference to ‘dirt’ associated 
with the behaviour of Romanies enforces this idea. Drawing on Douglas’s 
anthropology of ‘symbolic pollution’, Sibley (1995) claims that people that transgress 
moral (and spatial) boundaries are typically classified as ‘matter out of place’. 
Examples such as this one, of behaviour (or outcomes of behaviour) that it is seen as 
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violating social and moral conventions, depersonalizes and delegitimizes the 
Romanies, placing them beyond what is acceptable.   
This move of depersonalization and delegitimization is taken further in the 
next example. This is a fragment that comes before the previously analysed section, 
but even if does not follow sequentially from the previous, it is very important in its 
ideological significance, in as far as it constitutes an instance of a dehumanizing 
discourse within an ideology of moral exclusion.  
 
Extract 2 
 
411 
412 
413 
414 
415 
416 
417 
418 
419 
420 
421 
422 
423 
424 
425 
 
 
Sandra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chris 
Sandra 
 
Chris 
Sandra 
 
 
 
[…] 
I have brought them a sack of nice (.) clothes (.) they were  
walking in rags (.) (right) I have given them nice clothes, I have 
brought them a bag of food, cos’ they were eating from the garbage 
(.) just to see the next say (.) the nice clothes that I’ve given to 
them to wear, to get changed (.) if I stayed with them they’ve 
changed clothes (.) if not (.) they’ve thrown them into the garbage 
container (.) well, I don’t really know (.) why do they behave like 
this? It means that they like living in dirt (mm) in  
dirt, through (.) theft (.) and someone to help them (.)   
Where from do you think that this (.) originates? 
I think that it is something (.) which comes from (.) from (.) the 
ancestral (.) I don’t know (.) from (.) from their origin (.) 
From their nature? 
From their nature (.) there is (.) there is something (.) they don’t 
like (.) that’s why it is said that the gypsies are ‘koszos’ 
[…] 
 
 
 
411 
412 
413 
414 
415 
416 
417 
418 
419 
420 
421 
422 
423 
424 
425 
 
 
 
 
Sandra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chris 
Sandra 
 
Chris 
Sandra 
 
 
[…] 
Le-am dus un sac cu haine (.) frumoase (.) erau  
zdrenţăroşi (.) (da) le-am dat haine frumoase, le-am  
dus o plasă cu mâncare, că mâncau din gunoaie (.)  
ca a doua zi, hainele frumoase pe care  eu le-am dat  
să se îmbrace, să se schimbe (.) daca am stat lângă ei s-au 
schimbat, dacă nu (.) le-au aruncat la container  
(.) Păi, nici eu nu mai ştiu (.) De ce se comportă  
aşa? (.) înseamnă că le place să trăiască în murdărie (mm) în 
murdărie, prin (.) furt (.) Şi să-i ajute cineva (.) 
De unde credeţi că vine (.) treaba asta? 
Eu cred că este ceva (.) care vine din (.) din (.)  
ancestral (.) nu ştiu, din (.) din originea lor (.)  
Din natura lor? 
Din natura lor (.) au (.) au ceva (.) nu  
le place (.) de aia zici ca ţiganii îs ‘koszos’ (.) 
[…] 
 
   
 
The excerpt starts with Sandra offering a story of helping Romanies which on 
one hand emphasises her willingness to help ‘them’ and on the other hand, their 
reluctance (or one should say, refusal) to accept this kind of help.     
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Sandra’s story (lines 411-418) about helping does not have a straightforward 
conclusion, but finishes with Sandra’s puzzlement on the issue. ‘Well, I don’t really 
know (.)’ which is followed, after a small pause, by a question ‘why do they behave 
like this?’ (lines 417-418). Sandra herself volunteers to offer an explanation of their 
behaviour without the intervention of the interviewer: ‘It means that ‘they like living 
in dirt (mm) in dirt, through (.) theft (.) and someone to help them’ (lines 418-419). 
What this question does is to objectify, to make factual the subsequent explanation, 
presenting it as independent of her motives or desires, as a neutral and objective 
comment. Like in her previous account, Sandra explains the behaviour of Romanies 
using a rather extreme description ‘they like living in dirt’ which is followed by 
another reference to Romanies as living ‘through theft’. Her account closes on a tone 
of implicit indignation, which takes its force from the implicit expectancy of 
Romanies of being helped. 
The reference to ‘living in dirt’ is an explicit sign of a moral discourse that 
implicitly draws attention to a transgression of a moral boundary. The ascription of an 
inner personal disposition linked with the idea of ‘living in dirt’ essentializes this 
attributed stereotypical trait and makes is part of the Romany way of being. An 
implicit moral boundary is drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The significance of 
drawing moral boundaries is related to the positioning of Romanies beyond 
reasonable bounds, beyond a civilized and ‘clean’ moral order. 
After the question and answer sequence in lines 420-422 which deals with an 
explanation of the origins of this behaviour, in line 423 the interviewer seems to be 
asking for a clarification: ‘From their nature?’ and proposes a different label to 
summarise what Sandra has just said. This new ‘candidate’ is immediately taken up 
by Sandra who continues from where the interviewer has left: ‘From their nature (.) 
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there is (.) there is something (.) they don’t like (.) that’s why it is said that the gypsies 
are ‘koszos’’ (lines 424-425). The word that Sandra uses to describe the gypsies is not 
a Romanian word, but a Hungarian word. It is a rather general practice in 
Transylvania to use sometimes Hungarian words to convey some meanings that a 
seemingly equivalent Romanian word does not convey. The same happens here where 
Sandra uses the more extreme term ‘koszos’ to express and ascribe a moral quality of 
the Romanies instead of the milder Romanian equivalent ‘murdar’ literally 
translatable into ‘dirty’.         
Note the shift from talking about ‘living in dirt’ to the more extreme way of 
ascribing an essential moral quality to the Romanies through the use of ‘koszos’. 
There is a shift and upgrade from an inner personal disposition linked with a ‘way of 
life’ (‘living in dirt’) to a more extreme ascription of an intrinsic moral quality of 
Romanies. The implication of this upgrading is that ‘dirt’, ‘filth’ is not only 
something that Romanies like living in, it is something that is essentially part of their 
being, it is what they are. The upgrade in itself does not account for the extremity of 
these comments, but what accounts for it is rather the implicit symbolic assumptions 
behind a term such as ‘dirt’ or ‘filth’. As Kristeva has argued, ‘filth is not a quality in 
itself, but it applies only to what relates to a boundary and, more particularly, 
represents the object jettisoned out of that boundary, its other side, a margin’ (1982, p. 
69).  
This is an example of dehumanization, an extreme form of depersonalization, 
as Romanies are portrayed as abject, as horrible by the standards of ‘civilized’ society 
(note also the presentation of this as knowledge-in-common, as something of a 
common-place). This way of depicting the Romanies reinforces a view of Romanies 
as residual, as something that needs ‘cleaning’. ‘Pollution’ is to be seen as a type of 
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danger. As Mary Douglas (1966; see also Sibley, 1992) suggests, dirt is matter ‘out of 
place’. Romanies are thus ‘matter out of place’, beyond the boundaries of the 
acceptable. There is an implicit allusion to the idea that they are a ‘threat’ to order, to 
cleanliness. But it is not just lack of cleanliness that causes abjection, but also ‘what 
disturbs identity, system, order … does not respect borders, positions, rules’ 
(Kristeva, 1982, p. 4). Thus, it defines and justifies exclusion by defining Romanies as 
‘residual’, beyond what is acceptable. The implicit message is that such carriers of 
danger are to be cast away (and outside from) where orderly life is conducted and 
outside society’s bounds.  
In extract 3, one can see how a question about discrimination of Romanies 
leads into an account of Romanies’ incongruity with a normative moral (and spatial) 
order. 
 
Extract 3  
 
[Discussing the causes of discrimination against discrimination] 
 
 
80 
81 
82 
 
Chris 
[…] 
What do you think the causes of such discrimination that, that you 
talked about are? (.) I don’t know, for example, a Romany can be  
easily refused a job (1.2) 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Carla 
 
°Because to me°- (.) >what can I say< (.) >what are the causes?< (0.2) 
right? I think that everything happens because of them (.) so because 
even they don’t want (.) so they don’t have the desire (0.4) I don’t 
think that they are accepting (.) so, they would like to (0.4) to (.) 
so, >they don’t really like to work< (.) so, as far as I know,  
>they don’t own land to cultivate, to farm< and when they were offered  
a place to stay or something (.) I saw it on televi[sion(.)   
90 Chris                                                    [uh huh 
91 
92 
93 
94 
Carla 
 
that they’ve put their horses in (.) so (.) >even if there were flats< 
(.) where they managed to or (0.4) So (0.4) even them, what they 
receive, they ruin (.) so, they don’t (0.8)ºthey don’t respect, that’s 
the thingº (.) 
95 
96 
Chris Hmm 
(1.2) 
 
 
 
80 
81 
82 
 
Chris 
[…] 
Care credeţi că sunt cauzele acestei discriminări de, de care  
aminteaţi ? (.) Ştiu eu, de exemplu unui rom i se poate  
refuza foarte uşor un loc de muncă (1.2) 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Carla °Pentru că mi°- (.) >ce să zic< (.) >care sunt cauzele?< (0.2) 
nu?(.) eu zic că totul pornesc de la ei (.) deci pentru că 
nici ei nu vor(.) deci nu îşi doresc (0.4) nu  
cred că acceptă (.) deci ar vrea să (0.4) să (.)  
deci, >lor nu prea le place să muncească< (.) deci din câte ştiu eu, 
>n-au nici pământuri să cultive, să lucreze<, şi când li s-au oferit 
locuinţe sau ceva (.) am văzut la tele[vizor (.)   
90 Chris                                       [uh huh 
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91 
92 
93 
94 
Carla că şi-au băgat caii (.) deci (.) >chiar dacă au fost apartamente<  
(.) unde au reuşit sau (0.4) deci (0.4) şi ei ce  
primesc, distrug (.) deci, nu (0.8)ºcă nu respectă,  
asta e° (.)   
95 
96 
Chris Hmm 
(1.2) 
 
 
Through a similar apocryphal story of transgression based on an explicit 
reference to ‘them’ being offered a ‘place to stay or something’, Carla manages to 
‘morally constitute’ (Jayyusi, 1993) Romanies, their actions and outcomes presenting 
‘them’ and their actions as morally reprehensible (Stokoe, 2003; Tileagă, 2005a). 
There is an explicit formulation of transgression and the character of the 
impropriety is quite directly formulated: ‘They’ve put their horses in (.) so (.) even if 
there were flats (.) where they managed to or (0.4)’. It can be seen that by attracting 
attention to the idea that there were flats involved, and not any kind of residence (and 
definitely not a place to put your horses in), a normative standard of behaviour is 
invoked as the basis for complaining about the behaviour of Romanies. It is again, the 
same ideology of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour (Drew, 1998; Stokoe & 
Wallwork, 2003) embedded in powerful, very graphic a complaint that is drawn upon 
to construct a sense of Romanies as out-of-place, positioning them beyond reasonable 
bounds.   
Like Sandra before her, Carla can be seen as orienting to the issue of 
intentional and deliberate conduct in order to make manifest a transgression of an 
ordered space by the Romanies. Normative standards of conduct, common-sense 
morality of appropriateness/(in)appropriateness of conduct, warrant her final sense of 
moral indignation.  
The idea of a particular space (flats) which is being used for other purposes 
than those commonsensicallly attached to it, not only invokes normative standards of 
behaviour, but carries implications for the moral profile of the kind of people that 
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would do such a thing. There is a sort of moral ascription, a sort of implied reference 
to the moral character of Romanies. The final sense of indignation (lines 92-94), the 
direct reference to ‘ruin’ and the lack of ‘respect’ for ‘what they receive’ (again the 
reference to ‘our’ good intentions) add the last touch to the moral portrait and 
character of the Romanies.  
One does not need to assign extreme stereotypical attributes to the Romanies 
in order to achieve their depersonalization and delegitimization, relegation to a moral 
standing incompatible with a ‘civilized’, ‘ordered’ moral order. One can simply make 
reference to their extremely aloof behaviour, to their out-of-placeness and morally 
reprehensible character. This might be a safer option to avoid the potential 
accusations of prejudice, as these ‘stories’ are to be heard as legitimate complaints 
addressed to a rational ‘universal audience’ to which the idea that Romany behaviour 
(and character) is inappropriate and morally reprehensible is non-controversial (cf. 
Stokoe & Wallwork, 2003).  
Following Edwards (1997, p. 98), one could argue that the kind of descriptions 
or narratives that both Sandra and Carla have used are ‘”actions” precisely in that they 
construct one sense of events rather than another, and “provide for” upshots, 
conclusions’. It is not only the sense of events which is being constructed, but also 
constructing the actors involved as a certain type of people. In this case, Romanies are 
portrayed as transgressive, as not obeying to minimal rules of conduct, lacking 
respect for property and for spatial and moral order.   
This idea has wider implications that do not necessarily relate to the particular 
Romanian moral order, but to a more general contemporary society moral order. A 
more general point is made about the Romanies, which stresses the incongruity of 
their moral character with the contemporary moral order (cf. Tileagă, 2005a).  
 24 
As extract 4 shows, it also has implications for depersonalizing, 
delegitimizing, and ultimately dehumanizing Romanies, as such accounts draw upon 
displays of a particular socio-moral order of ‘character’, ‘being in the world’ and 
concerns with being in/out of place. 
It is Alina’s views, a thirty-five year old accountant, on the issue of integration 
of Romanies that are going to constitute the focus of the remainder of this paper. 
 
Extract 4 
 
413 
414 
415 
416 
417 
418 
419 
420 
421 
422 
 
 
Alina 
 
 
 
Chris 
Alina 
[…] 
I don’t see the gypsies integrating themselves among us, they don’t 
like the civilized style (.) by the way, they don’t want to go to 
school, they don’t want at all to progress (.) I cannot have an 
opinion about them (.) ha ha (.) but a bad one (.) 
Whose blame is it, do you think? 
Theirs, first of all, because I don’t think (.) effectively, they 
were dragged to school (.) they’ve been (.) they’ve been asked to 
integrate and they cannot (.) There is at the end of Oradea, I don’t 
know where, a block especially built for them and (.) they have 
eaten it from the ground like rats (.) isn’t that so?       
[…] 
 
 
413 
414 
415 
416 
417 
418 
419 
420 
421 
422 
 
 
 
Alina 
 
 
 
Chris 
Alina 
 
 
[…] 
Nu-i văd pe ţigani integrându-se între noi, nu le  
place stilul civilizat (.) de altfel, nu vor să meargă la  
şcoală, nu vor să evolueze deloc (.) Nu pot să am o  
părere despre ei (.) ha ha (.) decât proastă 
A cui credeţi că este vina? 
A lor, în primul rând, pentru că nu cred (.) efectiv, au  
fost duşi cu forţa la şcoală (.) au fost (.) li s-a cerut să se 
integreze şi nu pot (.) Există în capătul Oradiei, în nu ştiu ce 
cartier, bloc construit expres pentru ei şi (.) şi l-au  
mâncat din temelii precum şobolanii (.) nu? 
[…] 
 
 
 
In extract 4, Alina starts by admitting that she does not see ‘the gypsies 
integrating themselves among us’ (line 413) and what follows are justifications to 
support this idea: ‘they don’t like the civilized style’, ‘they don’t want to go to 
school’, ‘they don’t want at all to progress’ (lines 413-415).  
The essence of these descriptions is made relevant several lines later. The 
story that Alina offers in lines 420-422 brings this issue to the forefront.  This is not to 
be seen as a simple story of transgression, but its implications stretch beyond 
‘rational’ thought, into the realm of the irrational, the repressed, the unsaid. Note the 
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reference to ‘rats’ which dehumanizes Romanies and places them into the natural, 
presents them as vermin and achieves a relegation of Romanies to the status of the 
abject and denies their ‘human’ qualities. Through this specific representation, one 
can see that Romanies are again being associated with ‘dirt’ and the register of 
impurity and cleanliness is brought to the front. Rats are filthy animals which need to 
be eliminated for cleanliness and purity. As dirt has to be removed from ‘our’ houses, 
likewise, people categorized as ‘dirt’ are to be removed from ‘civilized’ society. This 
extreme description has eliminationist connotations. As rats are carriers of terrible 
diseases, in the same ways Romanies are carriers of an ultimate threat which must be 
eliminated5.  
This is taken further by Alina when talking on the same subject several lines 
later.  
 
Extract 5 
 
 
428 
429 
430 
431 
 
Alina 
 
 
 
[…] 
What can society do for them? (.) To make them a communal bath,  
they destroy it (.) it builds them a block (.) it is destroyed (.) 
No, you cannot take it with them, it is something like (.) like (.) 
the scum (.) the scum of society, how should I put it (mm)  
 
 
 
 
428 
429 
430 
431 
 
Alina 
 
 
 
 
 
[…] 
Ce poate să facă societatea cu ei? (.) să le facă o baie comunală, 
ţi-o distruge (.) le face un bloc (.) îl distruge (.)  
nu , nu se poate cu ei, e ceva de (.) de (.)  
pleava (.) pleava societăţii, cum să zic (mm) 
 
 
 
 
The opening rhetorical questions sets the Romany ‘problem’ as an issue 
without a ‘solution’. It is implied that there is nothing that the (our) society can do for 
them: ‘To make them a communal bath, they destroy it (.) it builds them a block (.) it 
is destroyed (.)’ (lines 428-429). Note the objectivity and factuality of her 
                                                 
5 In their analysis of anti-semitism, Adorno et al. (1950) make reference to the power and ideological 
consequences  of eliminationist imagery. For example, there is mention of ‘the metaphor of the rotten 
apple in the barrel conjures up the imagery of "evil germs" which is associated with appalling 
regularity with the dream of an effective germicide’ (p. 653)  
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descriptions. The implication is that the Romanies are the ‘problem’, a problem, that 
is, to the rest of society. One can see how thin is the line from this position to the 
implicit notion that this problem has to be dealt with according to its own special 
requirements that pertains to the problematic nature of the Romanies leading naturally 
to a ‘solution’ outside the bounds of democratic and moral procedure. Being cast as 
the ‘problem’ that calls for a solution, the Romanies are not regarded anymore as 
moral subjects, they are denied ‘moral command’ (Bauman, 1990) and an 
autonomous moral standing in the world. In lines 430-431, Alina is in a search of a 
formulation that could capture the previous (and the general feeling about Romanies), 
formulation which eventually comes in line 431: ‘the scum of society’. 
This is not presented as a peremptory description, but it is ‘proposed’ as to 
capture the essence of what Romanies are. Like in her previous intervention, one can 
see how the use of a metaphor of residue stands as a metaphor for residual people. To 
categorize them as residual, as abject par excellence is again to ignore their visible 
human qualities and to allude to a conclusion with eliminationist connotations. All the 
premises are there, are explicit, but not the conclusion. The conclusion is something 
that cannot be directly stated. Whilst the consequences of Romany behaviour and way 
of being are (made) problematic, the consequences of this problematic ‘eliminationist’ 
categorization are not.  
There is a call for an implicit solution. Evidence has also been presented that 
rational solutions to the ‘problem’ have not worked. The implicit message is that there 
is no rational solution to deal with ‘them’. One could argue, that in such 
circumstances of depersonalizing and dehumanizing talk, immoral and social 
forbidden desires lurk under the surface of this ideology of ‘moral exclusion’. The 
immoral, eliminationist conclusion is implicitly contained in the premises. Going on 
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the steps of Freud, Billig cogently argues that ‘immorality always lurks on the edge of 
overdemanding morality’ (1997, p. 148).  What is not said, what is absent from the 
interaction cannot be nevertheless absent from the analysis. The repression of 
immorality, what is not said (but could easily have been) becomes of central 
importance.  
 
Discussion 
 
In the social psychological literature, it has been often assumed that particular 
instances of extreme prejudice and moral exclusion are manifestations of prejudice 
and out-group hate or just another extension of universal socio-cognitive identity 
mechanisms and psychological processes.  The historical and ideological particularity 
of discursive traditions, the locatedeness and place-boundedness of these phenomena 
have not been studied in their own right. Notions such as depersonalization, 
delegitimization and dehumanization have been typically accounted for independently 
of the actual practices people are involved in. The focus has been more on their 
intrinsic psychological, ‘process’-type and functional aspects. As such, social 
psychologists’ empirical practices and results seem to derive ‘more from the nature of 
the analysts’ gaze than from what is gazed upon’ (Reicher, 2004, p. 924). 
This paper has illustrated how a critical discursive approach which attempts to 
bridge detailed interactional analyses with critical concerns can inform social 
psychologists’ understanding of the ways in which  depersonalization, 
delegitimization and dehumanization are played up in talk,  how they are produced 
and reproduced in the discursive management of category memberships, extreme 
‘difference’ and moral standings in the world. Depersonalization, delegitimization and 
dehumanization are complex discursive accomplishments dependent on a range of 
constructive processes.  
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Most social psychological theories have offered a generalized view on the targets 
of prejudice. There is no sense in which one group might be described more 
negatively (and descriptions leading to different ideological effects) than the other. 
The indiscriminate use of stereotypes and biased judgment apply to all target-groups, 
which are placed on the same footing. The issue of precisely how some particulars 
groups of people become (or are made) the target of prejudice (extreme prejudice) has 
been under-explored.  
In order to consider that, one needs to take into account the discursive basis of 
ideology and the importance of the social and ideological climate; how emergent 
constructions of depersonalization, delegitimization and dehumanization are 
embedded in descriptions of located spatial activities and moral standings in the world 
and the power to exclude that comes from invoking and building a socio-moral order 
linked to notions of sub-humanity (non-humanity), (spatial) transgression, out-
placeness, abjection. As such, a focus on description rather than explanation might be 
more effective in understanding the dynamics of ideologies of moral exclusion. 
The significance of treating notions such as depersonalization, 
delegitimization and dehumanization as social practices should include an awareness 
of a dynamic process that does not presupposes the unproblematic distinction 
(attribution) of natural/cultural characteristics or primary/secondary emotions, but 
includes elements of the social and moral order. As this paper has suggested, it 
includes references to transgression of physical and moral boundaries, references to 
normal/abnormal behaviour, extreme negative depiction, orientations to moral 
standings in the world. The accounts analysed in this paper are not intrinsically 
depersonalizing, delegitimizing or dehumanizing. For example, in some 
circumstances, Romanies were not directly denied humanity, but they were 
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nevertheless presented as the ‘wrong sort’ of human beings (Rorty, 1989) and in the 
‘wrong place’. Romanies were not being portrayed as rational actors, on the same 
moral footing and sharing the same moral space with the majority group. Romanies 
are not seen as being part of the same moral ‘community’ as the other groups 
(Romanians, Hungarians and other ethnic minority groups), as they are cast as abject, 
as matter ‘out-of-place’ (see Tileaga, 2005c, on how the same participants talk in a 
very different way about the Hungarian minority). This kind of discourse of extreme 
prejudice and difference is marked by an absence: Romanies have no homeland like 
other nations. As such, extreme prejudice contains or implies the ‘differentiating 
power’ of the absence of a national space. 
When one is considering delegitimization, depersonalization and 
dehumanization as discursive practices, one might also want to take into account that 
the dialogue between the interviewer and the interviewee might create its own unsaid 
matters. As Billig put it, ‘if conscious thought is shaped by rhetoric, then so might the 
dynamics of dialogue provide the resources for repression’ (1998, p. 206). The way is 
opened to a process of ‘social repression’ (Billig, 1999) in relation to a specific 
category of people, that ‘we’ (not necessarily Romanians), the settled, the civilized 
etc. categorize as being matter out-of-place, as abject, as horrible and deplorable, try 
to place beyond reasonable bounds and moral ‘being’ in the world.  
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Transcription notations 
(.) Micro-pause 
 
(2.0) Pause length in seconds 
 
[overlap] Overlapping speech 
 
˚ Encloses speech that is quieter than the surrounding talk  
 
yes Underlining indicates stress or emphasis in the speech 
 
>faster< Encloses speeded up talk 
 
(clears throat) Comments from the transcriber 
 
Ha ha Laughter 
 
  
 
 
